Geopolitical importance of Nagorno-Karabakh

File:Artsakh Occupation Map.png. (2023, September 25). Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved 19:14, December 12, 2023 from https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Artsakh_Occupation_Map.png&oldid=804529067.

The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 meant the emergence of 15 new republics, or in other words, new sovereign states, which brought up political problems together with their emergence, especially for the small countries that were divided up by ethnic lines. Not long after the dissolution of the USSR, the tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia reached a boiling point. First, the Nagorno-Karabagh War broke out in 1992 and ended with an Armenian victory. As Armenia had a tragic history of nation-state construction, the war caused heavy casualties in Armenia, with about 30000 losses in 2 years’ time. As a very young and geographically small state, Armenia has had a favorable outcome thanks to being part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) agreement. The foundation of CSTO was very similar to NATO, and it required member states to back other member states in case of outside aggression.

Up to the status of the 2023 Armenia- Azerbaijan conflict, the political relations were unstable. 2016- 2020 and 2022 witnessed the breakout of wars between two countries, each leading to various heavy outcomes. At the 2016 war, Azerbaijan tried to receive the back of Turkey during the war. Aliyev's relations with Putin were growing at that time. Whereas when coming into the battle of 2020, the result was the deployment of 2000 Russian peacekeepers to the ground; when the buffer zone between the two countries was eliminated, the Lachin corridor, the sole road connecting Armenia to the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, became massively important for Armenia.

However, 2022 battle started differently, Azerbaijan wanted to take advantage of the Ukraine- Russian war to launch an attack, although Pashinyan took a drastic step to activate the CSTO’S collective defense clause, Russia and the CSTO declined to intervene. The balance of power had drifted precisely in the favor of Azerbaijan.

What has been happening now in the region? And the geopolitical importance of Nagoro-Karabakh for other countries in the region.

Since the onset of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the regional power dynamics have been in a state of flux, particularly in the South Caucasus. On the one hand, the European Union has been increasingly engaged in the region, providing significant support to Ukraine and condemning Russian military actions as acts of aggression. On the other hand, both Georgia and Armenia have been forging closer ties with Western nations. Meanwhile, Russia strives to maintain a neutral stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, mindful of its reliance on Azerbaijan for a north-south trade corridor to the Persian Gulf, a necessity driven by Western sanctions resulting from the Ukraine invasion.

Concurrently, the 2018 Armenian Velvet Revolution, which caused a change in the Armenian authority, had a tremendous impact on the discontent and conflict between the two countries and escalated the tension when the CSTO did not act to defend Armenia in 2022. Therefore, it was likely that Armenia started to build closer ties with the West, and Pashinyan canceled joint CSTO drills and declared that Armenia was no longer an ally of Russia. Immediately after, Pashinyan made the decision to send humanitarian aid to Ukraine and initiated collaborative military efforts with the U.S. to bring the Armenian army up to NATO standards.

From a Middle East security standpoint, Iran, Israel, and Turkey are each pursuing unique policies driven by their security concerns and geopolitical objectives. Iran, for instance, openly backs Armenia as part of its strategy to establish a rail corridor linking the Azerbaijani mainland to its Nakhichevan exclave. Recognizing that this corridor represents the sole route for Iran to access Western markets, it extends military assistance to Armenia to deter Azerbaijani forces from gaining control over the corridor. Moreover, Israel's efforts to deploy drones from Azerbaijani bases inclined Iran further towards supporting Armenia.

On the contrary, this option would offer Turkey a significant advantage, enabling the export of goods to the Central Asian market. Furthermore, Turkey is the primary conduit for Azerbaijan's oil and gas exports, with Azerbaijan emerging as a major investor in Turkey. Plus, Azerbaijan is very keen to facilitate trade through the Caspian Sea and providing vital route for transporting goods to the neighboring countries, in this manner being a NATO member is also an advantage for Azerbaijan.

While the Black Sea is predominantly under Russian control, the strategic positioning of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia at key access points in the region has the potential to influence the balance of power, particularly in their evolving relationships with NATO countries and the EU. Notably, the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013, which prioritizes the revitalization of ancient Silk Road trade routes, underscores the growing significance of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan's strategic locations. These countries now play a pivotal role in facilitating trade between Central Asia and West Asia, serving as crucial corridors for transporting goods to neighboring nations. This significance extends to Azerbaijan's role through the Caspian Sea. It is evident that the EU and the US have been actively working to strengthen their political ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan, considering these developments.

The strong variables of the balance of power in the region have been massively affected by the support given to the main players of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  While Turkey and Israel militarily support Azerbaijan, India and Iran give support to Armenia. In this respect, Nakhcivan has a very important strategic point that will influence the course of the conflict. In summary, if Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan unite to assert their political influence in the region and garner support from the United States and European nations, the Caucasus region could become inaccessible to Russia, Iran, India, and other Asian countries.

As a response, Russia, India, and Iran would undoubtedly implement measures to assist nations that oppose Western-supported influences, thereby maintaining a regional balance of power. Nevertheless, the eventual resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is expected to favor Azerbaijan, potentially tilting the balance in favor of one party in the region, which could impact the dynamics of power politics in the Eastern Mediterranean.