The Future of Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean: Post-Assad Era
- Ceren Cano
- Feb 24
- 6 min read
The Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East are crucial for Russia due to geopolitical strategy, military interests, economic opportunities, and countering Western influence. Predicting Russia's strategy has become vital following the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
In essence, the region has always been the battleground for power struggles between major international actors, namely the United States and its allies, the Soviet Union (SU) during the Cold War, and Russia after the dissolution of the SU. Since then, Russia's regional interests have always been based on the following themes: the security of the homeland and the protection of maritime trade routes linking Russia to world markets.
Given Russia's long-standing role as its closest and most reliable ally in the region, the fall of Assad and the weakening of Hezbollah forces have also raised questions about the future location of the Russian naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean and the diplomatic and political strategies through which Russia will continue to pursue its core interests. However, in order to assess the future direction of its policy after the fall of Assad, it is first necessary to analyse the strategic importance of the Middle East for Russia.
The region is a strategic fulcrum for Russia's power projection in the region and Africa. Syria has been a key strategic point for Moscow in its diplomatic relations with Washington and thus a valuable negotiating tool. Even during the Ukraine-Russia war, Russia's military presence in Syria has been a strategic counterweight in its relations with Turkey. Russia even used the presence of Russian bases in Syria as an effective tool to prevent the supply of arms to Ukraine. In this sense, Syria was not only a symbol of Russia's past successes but also played an important role in Moscow's broader global strategy.
One of Russia's main naval facilities was located in the Syrian port of Tartus in the Eastern Mediterranean. In 2005, Syria agreed to allow the expansion of its naval facilities at Tartus in exchange for writing off more than 70 percent of its Soviet-era debt of $13 billion. Following Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the deterioration of its relations with the West, Assad reportedly allowed Russia to turn Tartus into a permanent naval base and station nuclear submarines there. This strategic manoeuvre was aimed at ensuring regional influence and securing Russian influence from a critical position in the Eastern Mediterranean. In particular, Tartus, which had become the only Russian military presence in the Mediterranean, also served as the Russian logistics center in Africa.
With the strategic importance of Tartus established, Russia has also sought to expand its influence in Africa. Russia recently negotiated a maritime agreement with Sudan to establish a presence in the Red Sea after the fall of Assad, in order to strengthen its influence, especially in trade, and to continue to balance other powers in the region. At the same time, Russia is utilising its presence in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali to expand its influence in Africa. Russia's support for Haftar's forces in Libya disrupts Europe's oil supplies and enables its military expansion southwards. By supporting local governments in the Sahel and disrupting uranium exports to the West, Russia is weakening France in particular and contributing to the withdrawal of the French army since 2022.
Russian mercenaries are committed to stabilizing the regimes of countries in exchange for lucrative mining contracts, using gold and diamonds to circumvent Western sanctions. In this regard, the Khmeimim base in Syria played an important role in facilitating operations in Africa. Russia's support for Assad coincided with Iranian and Hezbollah interests, strengthening its strategic position in the region.
Moscow also established close relations with the Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, through its efforts to regulate the oil markets within the OPEC+ framework, which led to several successful agreements. It has achieved an unprecedented expansion of its relations with the United Arab Emirates in the areas of trade, investment, and strategic cooperation, and, through coordination with Qatar, aims to maintain its shares in the traditional gas markets. In addition, Moscow resumed arms deliveries to the Egyptian army for the first time since the 1990s, carried out economic projects in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, and began construction of the first nuclear reactor in Dabaa on the Mediterranean coast.[1]
On the one hand, Russia has forged alliances with Middle Eastern governments to keep prices high and signed agreements to build nuclear reactors in Egypt and Algeria. Russia's strategic objective is in fact to counter the United States and create a security framework that includes major powers such as Russia as well as key regional players. [2]
Future Actions of Russia
In order to safeguard its core geographical interests, Russia will continue to use diplomatic, military, and other means to manage its relations with regional actors, while at the same time strengthening its presence to secure its maritime and territorial space. Potential strategies could include maintaining a military presence by negotiating with the new Syrian government, focusing on Libya, thereby developing a new diplomatic approach, deepening economic engagement with regional actors, developing relations with radical groups to counterbalance Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in exchange for protecting its military bases, and maintaining relations with Turkey while using its role as a mediator between regional actors.
From a pragmatic perspective, Russia and HTS share common interests. At this stage, HTS will seek to strengthen its legitimacy, while Russia will seek to strengthen its military presence through different strategies. This could include supporting the Alawite community in Latakia, where it has bases, similar to the US approach to the Kurds in Syria. Russia can also deepen its relations with radical groups around the world by offering them recognition and strategic advantages.[3]
Russia will also continue its efforts to strengthen economic cooperation with regional actors. Of particular importance are Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. Saudi Arabia is a key ally because of its dominance in global energy markets and its considerable geopolitical influence. On the other hand, Iran will use Russia's influence against the United States to become a regional power, while Russia will seek to balance Iran's dominance in the region. Turkey is in a more specific position. This is both because it is trying to act as an economic partner of the states in the region, especially Syria, to overcome Western sanctions, and because it is trying to make it possible for the diplomatic dialogue between Ukraine and Russia to continue through it. In addition, it wants to take the initiative in the transport of the Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves to Europe. Currently, this project has stalled due to Turkey's objection to the pipeline route. However, if Turkey receives support from Libya and Syria, the project, which was suspended after the US withdrew its support in 2022, could be revived, possibly with a Libya-Northern Cyprus pipeline and a Syria-Northern Cyprus or Syria-Turkey pipeline. Its realisation would reduce Russia's energy pressure on Europe. Likewise, Russia's hegemony in European energy markets could be weakened by the large reserves in the South Pars/North Dome field between Iran and Qatar.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Russia's Middle East strategy after Assad's ouster will be determined by a mix of geopolitical, military, and economic concerns to maintain its regional influence. Russia's attempts to extend its power to the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa will be largely determined by the retention of its military assets in Libya, notably the Tartus naval station and Khmeimim airport. Despite the turmoil in Syria, Russia will continue to adapt by strengthening its ties with key regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey and by negotiating with new political factions. While Iran is a target of Russia's containment efforts and Saudi Arabia is an important ally, Turkey presents a complex dynamic as both a geopolitical rival and an economic partner. The stalled Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline project demonstrates Turkey's resilience. While Turkey's resilience is evidenced by the blocked Eastern Mediterranean Gas Pipeline project, rerouting the pipeline through Syria with Turkey's support could greatly reduce Russia's energy influence on Europe. Exploiting energy cooperation with the Gulf states, countering US influence, and mediating regional disputes are other elements of Russia's broader agenda. In negotiating these changing circumstances, Russia will continue to develop its economic, political, and military capabilities to advance its strategic objectives in the Middle East. In short, the manoeuvres of different power centres in the region will continue.
Sources:
1. Wilson Center (2025, February 24). China and Russia in the Middle East: Seeking Integration Under a "Common Goal". Retrieved February 14, 2025, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/china-and-russia-middle-east-seeking-integration-under-common-goal
2. Middle East Monitor (2025, February 24). Why isn’t Russia involved in the Gaza war? Retrieved February 14, 2025, from https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240418-why-isnt-russia-involved-in-the-gaza-war/
3. Carnegie politika (2025, February 24). Can Russia Reach a Deal With Syria’s New Rulers? Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. Retrieved February 14, 2025, from https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/12/syria-russia-new-relationships?lang=en
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